Catching Flies with Chopsticks: China\u27s Strategic Leap into Wireless Telecommunications by Abramson, Rachael
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2002
Catching Flies with Chopsticks: China's Strategic
Leap into Wireless Telecommunications
Rachael Abramson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abramson, Rachael, "Catching Flies with Chopsticks: China's Strategic Leap into Wireless Telecommunications" (2002). Minnesota
Journal of International Law. 199.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/199
Articles
Catching Flies with Chopsticks,: China's
Strategic Leap into Wireless
Telecommunications
Rachael Abramson*
Advanced telecommunications are redefining China's rela-
tionship with the West as China enters the Communications
Revolution. China seeks foreign capital to propel a twenty-first
century telecommunications infrastructure, but remains wary of
foreign ownership. Western businesses seek the benefits of a
market of over one billion consumers, but face the daunting risk
of losing their investment without legal recourse. In the past,
American movement into the Chinese market has been tepid;
however, this American reluctance towards Chinese ventures
will not last.
The World Bank predicts that China will be the world's sec-
ond largest trader by 2020.2 The growth in the Chinese econ-
omy combined with the development currently taking place in
Chinese telecommunications law and China's entrance into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) will contribute to increased
foreign investment. The developing economic and political
structure will allow American businesses to compete on a level
1. MUSASHI MIYAMOTO, THE BOOK OF FIvE RINGS (Bantam 1992) (1643) (The
ability to catch flies with ones' chopsticks is indicative of one with superior skill and
discipline). The art can be traced to Japanese martial arts master and author
Musashi Miyamoto. The concept was later reprised in a scene with Karate Master
Mr. Miyagi in the movie "The Karate Kid."
* J.D., 2001, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.,
1998, Boston University.
2. Yukon Huang, Director, World Bank China Program, Realizing China's Po-
tential, Address at the Asian Investment Conference (March 2000) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org.cn/english/content/529z6146591.shtml); see also
Will Martin & Christian Bach, The Importance of State Trading in China's Trade
Regime, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 155 (Frederick M. Abbott ed.,
1998).
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playing field while providing the businesses with their desired
legal security.
In exchange for entrance into the WTO, China has promised
unprecedented access to foreigners to invest in its telecommuni-
cations market. The terms of entry open the Chinese telecom-
munications service market by allowing as much as fifty percent
foreign ownership in some sectors over the next two years, up
from a complete absence of foreign ownership presently. 3
China's membership in the WTO will provide legal recourse for
failed foreign investments and represent China's promise to be
bound by international law.4
China has strategically acquiesced to unprecedented mar-
ket entry for foreign telecommunications providers, while re-
serving market power in the wireless field. For three years,
China will reap the benefits of foreign investment in wireless
technology without granting those investors power of manage-
ment.5 In so doing, China will "leapfrog" obsolete wireline tech-
nology and introduce the cyber-cel connector. 6 Wireless technol-
ogy will provide the backbone needed to bring voice and data
services into remote areas. The expansion of telecommunica-
tions services into rural areas will help curb the risks of rural
uprisings and urban migration, alleviate the digital divide, and
encourage legal uniformity by widely disseminating informa-
tion. China will guide this growth with pro-leapfrogging policy
that encourages telecommunications providers to provide wire-
less services to underserved communities.
Part I of this Article traces the history of China's accession
3. See European Commission, EU-China WTO Accession Negotiations, High-
lights of the EU-China Agreement on WTO, at http'//europa.eu.intcomm/trade/
bilateral/china/high.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001); see also Clay Chandler,
China Clears Barrier to WTO, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at D1.
4. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round vol. 1, Annex II, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
The dispute resolution mechanism of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
was established in 1994 to administer and adjudicate disputes regarding trading
rules in a judicial-type dispute settlement system. Id. Nations must accept this
mechanism to enjoy the privileges of WTO membership. Id.
5. See European Commission, supra note 3.
6. Sundeep Reddy, Innovation Leaps Past Tradition in China's Emergence,
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., June 25, 2000, available at
http://www.rochesterbusinessnews.com/extra/0625chinainnovation.html. This arti-
cle discusses leapfrogging solely in the context of wireless and wireline technologies.
The "cyber-cel connector" represents the possibilities of wireless technology, which
can bring Internet access (cyber) and phone services (cel) to remote areas more
quickly and easily than deployment of wireline infrastructure.
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to the WTO and the commitments China has agreed to uphold
regarding its telecommunications sector. Part II describes the
development of China's telecommunications industry and its
rapid growth in recent years in anticipation for foreign competi-
tion as it prepares to become the largest telecommunications
market in the world. Part III explains how some characteristics
of China's legal system may make it difficult to apply WTO
standards in China's marketplace, and concludes those differ-
ences can be resolved. Part III also examines the restrictions on
market entry China intends to retain and the risks involved in
state ownership of its domestic communications providers, ulti-
mately concluding that the risks arising from these arrange-
ments will decrease with time. Part IV analyzes the leapfrog-
ging policy, which would encourage the implementation of
wireless technology in rural and urban areas. This Article con-
cludes that China should pursue leapfrogging policy, making
strides toward universal service, better interconnection of its
government, and a telecommunications infrastructure unbur-
dened by past regulation of obsolete technologies, which will en-
able further investment and development.
I. TELECOMMUNICATIONS' ROLE IN CHINA'S
ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. HISTORY OF CHINA'S EFFORT TO JOIN THE WTO
After World War II, twenty-three countries negotiated the
tariff reductions embodied in the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7 China was one of the original con-
tracting parties.8 However, after the Communists came to
power in Beijing and China's Nationalist government fled to
Taiwan in 1949, China withdrew from the GATT. 9 More than
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; see also JEFFREY S. THOMAS
& MICHAEL A. MEYER, THE NEW RULES OF GLOBAL TRADE 3-4 (1997). GATT 1947
was replaced by the GATT 1994, which established the World Trade Organization
(WTO). See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, April 15, 1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316 at
1381 (1994).
8. GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 are legally distinct, so a contracting party of
the former must be granted separate membership to the WTO Agreement before it
can obtain rights or obligations under the latter. See THOMAS & MEYER, supra note
7, at 52.
9. Greg Mastel, China and the World Trade Organization: Moving Forward
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thirty years passed before China successfully opened its market
to the West with its experimental Open Door Policy.'0 In the
mid-1980's, China expressed interest in reinstating its GATT
obligations in order to obtain GATT trading benefits." Momen-
tum towards reentry faltered as China's relations with the West
soured in 1989 after the Chinese government sent forces to
quash the democratization movement at Tiananmen Square. 12
Time has significantly healed the rift between China and the
West, leading to a rebirth in negotiations for China's accession
to the WTO. 13
1. Jackson-Vanik Amendment
The United States expressed its condemnation of China's
totalitarian reaction to the Tiananmen Square uprising by using
trade as leverage to demand policy changes from China.14 In-
voking an obscure emigration Amendment to the Trade Act of
1974,15 the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 6 the United States
complicated China's yearly renewal of its "most favored nation"
(MFN) status by linking China's trade privileges with an annual
review of its human rights practices. 17 MFN status permits
Without Sliding Backward, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 981, 982 (2000). The GATT
was never a formal international organization, but became the primary multilateral
trade agreement when the ITA failed. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 7, at 4-5. The
GATT served as the framework for negotiations on trade issues, such as the Tokyo
and Uruguay Rounds, that resulted in the development of the World Trade Organi-
zation. Id.
10. JOHN K FAIRBANK ET AL., EAST ASIA: TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION 980
(1989).
11. Mastel, supra note 9, at 981-82.
12. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION
THROUGH REFORM 141-42 (1995) (description of the political underpinnings of the
Tiananmen Square incident).
13. See Mastel, supra note 9, at 981-82.
14. See Di Jiang-Schuerger, The Most Favored Nation Trade Status and China:
The Debate Should Stop Here, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1321, 1333 (1998).
15. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 1, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (2000)).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2000)).
The 1975 Jackson-Vanik Amendment applies to nonmarket economies, generally
Communist countries, defined as "any foreign country that the administering au-
thority determines does not operate on market principles or cost or pricing struc-
tures, so that the sales of merchandise in such a country do not reflect the fair value
of the merchandise." Id; see also Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 14, at 1329, 1342.
17. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 1, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. 88 2101-2487 (2000)); see also The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
to the Trade Act of 1974, § 402 of the Trade Act (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2000));
Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China Act, Pub. L. No. 106- 286, 114 Stat.
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nonmarket economies, which are generally Communist nations,
to engage in frictionless trade with the United States on the
same nondiscriminatory terms given to other nations.'8 MFN
status from the Trade Act and the 1979 Agreement on Trade Re-
lations between China and the United States 19 endowed China
with nondiscriminatory export privileges and access to the
United States' market.
2. Congressional Approval to Exempt China from Annual MFN
Renewal
The United States ended this controversial, ten-year prac-
tice in September 2000 by granting China "permanent normal
trade relations" (PNTR). This action eliminated heated yearly
negotiations and allowed China to market its goods in the
United States on a nondiscriminatory basis. 20 For this right,
China made significant concessions to open its market to foreign
trade. China and the United States set forth these concessions
in the United States-China Bilateral Market Access Agreement
of March 2000, which was negotiated for three years between
China and the United States Trade Representative (USTR).21
China also pursued bilateral negotiations with every WTO
member country, seeking unanimous approval for WTO mem-
bership. Following the United States-China agreement, EU-
China negotiations achieved more favorable terms. The favor-
able terms will apply to all WTO members regardless of whether
those members themselves achieved them, because the goal of
the WTO is nondiscriminatory access for all member countries.22
880 (2000) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2431). In June 1999 "most favored nation"
tariff treatment was renamed "normal trade relations" for United States Trade Law
purposes. The WTO still uses "most favored nation" in WTO agreements and other
trade agreements. See GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORLD TRADE RELATIONS
ORGANIZATION: CHINA'S MEMBERSHIP STATUS AND NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS
ISSUES (1994); see also Leo Wise, Trading With China, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 567
(2001).
18. White House China Trade Relations Working Group, The 1979 Agreement
(2000) (on file with author).
19. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 1202 U.N.T.S.
180, 31 U.S.T. 4651.
20. See Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
286, 114 Stat. 880 (2000) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2431); see also Jiang-
Schuerger, supra note 14, at 1338; Wise, supra note 17, at 567 (detailing the his-
torical procession of China-United States trade agreements).
21. See Agreement on Market Access, U.S.-P.R.C. available at
http://www.uschina.org.
22. See European Commission, supra note 3; see also Mastel, supra note 9, at
2002]
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3. United States-China Bilateral Accession Agreement:
Telecommunications
One of the defining features of China's membership in the
WTO is the market accessibility China has allowed foreign tele-
communications providers. With the signing of the Information
Technology Agreement, China will open its market to foreign
telecommunications goods. To allow foreign competition in tele-
communications services, China will sign the WTO Basic Tele-
communications Agreement. 23  The Clinton Administration
gained Congressional support for China's accession by touting
the deal as a win-win situation: the United States had nothing
to lose and everything to gain because the benefits of joining
alone was persuasion enough for China to concede foreign in-
vestment opportunities in telecommunications. 24 Upon acces-
sion, China must equalize its trade relationships internation-
ally.25
a. Telecommunications Goods: "Information Technology
Agreement"
China's endorsement of the Information Technology Agree-
ment (ITA)26 should significantly reduce or eliminate the tariff,
quota, and other restrictions China currently places on United
982.
23. Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Fourth Protocol to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997); The White House, The
U.S.-China WTO Accession Deal: A Clear Win for U.S. High Technology, Greater
Openness and U.S. Interests 36-37 (April 6, 2000) available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/China/Docs/ExportAmerica/finalEA36-38.pdf [hereinafter
W.H. Clear Win Memo].
24. See Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Dept. of State, China: WTO Ac-
cession and Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), Fact Sheet, Bureau of Pub-
lic Affairs (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-chinapntr-
wto_000524.html. "This agreement will require no new market opening steps by the
U.S .... Instead, the U.S. will simply maintain the market access policies we cur-
rently apply." Id.; see also United States-China Business Council, Questions and
Answers: U.S.-China WTO Agreement (Dec. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.uschina.orgpublic/wto/b4ct/qanda.html; The White House, China Trade
Relations Working Group, Examples of How The China WTO Agreement Will Help
America's High-Tech Industries (March 1, 2000), available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/China/docs/hightechhelp.htm [hereinafter W.H. High Tech
Memo].
25. Mastel, supra note 9, at 987.
26. Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products,
WT/MIN(96)/16, Dec. 13, 1996 available at http-/www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/inftec-elitadec-e.htm.
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States companies selling telecommunications goods. Present re-
strictions limit sales when telecommunications goods and tariffs
averaging thirteen percent tack $200 onto a $1500 computer.27
United States companies are also required to set up joint ven-
tures with state-run middlemen; foreign companies have had no
direct access to Chinese customers.28 Joint venture laws require
foreign companies to transfer technology to their Chinese part-
ners and use a percentage of locally sourced parts.29
The ITA requires several actions by China. The country is
to eliminate quotas, grant trading and distribution rights to for-
eign companies by 2003, and eliminate all tariffs on telecommu-
nications equipment by 2005.30 American companies in China
will be permitted to import American goods into China and op-
erate distribution networks with direct access to consumers,
rather than routing the sale of their products through Chinese
factories and partners.31 Finally, China will not condition im-
port licenses and investment approval on performance or tech-
nology requirements, as it has done in the past.32
Even with the traditional restrictions discussed above,
China is the world's fastest growing telecommunications mar-
ket, second in size only to the United States.33 China's informa-
tion technology equipment market is growing annually at an es-
timated twenty to forty percent.34 In personal computer sales,
some predict China will be the industry leader within the next
five to ten years.35 In landlines, China installs enough phone in-
frastructure each year to replace networks the size of Pacific
27. W.H. High Tech Memo, supra note 24, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (reporting that China agrees to commit "to eliminate tariffs on all prod-
ucts covered by the ITA-two-thirds of ITA products by 2003 and the remaining one-
third by 2005"). Another White House report states that "China will eliminate in-
formation technology tariffs by 2005, grant trading and distribution rights by 2003."
W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra note 23, at 37. See also Remarks by Ambassador
Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Rep., Computer and Communications
Industry Ass'n, Information Technology and Trade Policy: A Look Back, A Look
Ahead (June 5, 2000) (on file with author).
31. W.H. High Tech Memo, supra note 24. United States firms can import
anywhere into China without geographic restrictions. W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra
note 23. 1
32. W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra note 23, at 37. This enables American busi-
nessmen to export from the United States rather than opening a business in China
to sell products in China. Id.
33. W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra note 23, at 36.
34. Id. at 38.
35. See Chandler, supra note 3, at D1.
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Bell.36 At the end of 1999, China had about forty million tele-
phone subscribers. 37
b. Telecommunications Services: "Basic Telecommunications
Agreement"
China's exponential growth in telecommunications
equipment production parallels its progress in the
telecommunications service market, where it recently overtook
the United States as the world leader in mobile phone
subscriptions. 38  In an unprecedented show of openness to
foreign competition in its bid for WTO accession, China agreed
to comply with the pro-competition regulatory principles of the
Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA).39 Although not
every WTO member has signed on to the BTA, the Agreement
successfully opened ninety-five percent of the world telecommu-
nications market to competition and covered nearly one trillion
dollars in telecommunications trade following its 1997 adop-
tion.40
Upon accession to the WTO, China will gradually increase
the percentage of foreign investment permitted in its
telecommunications service market, thus lifting the ban on
foreign involvement in this sector.41 Telecommunications pro-
viders in WTO member countries will enjoy access to China's ex-
isting telecommunications infrastructure. China will permit
domestic and foreign telecommunications service providers to
interconnect the incumbent supplier's public telecommunica-
tions networks under nondiscriminatory terms and at cost-
orientated rates, supervised by an independent regulatory au-
thority.42
The United States-China agreement specifies which tele-
36. W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra note 23, at 36.
37. Id. at 36-37.
38. Chandler, supra note 3, at D1.
39. W.H. Clear Win Memo, supra note 23, at 36.
40. Barshefsky, supra note 30. The new rules for basic telecom took force on
January 1, 1998. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 7, at 248.
41. Remarks by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Rep.,
Nortel Network Policy Forum, China's WTO Accession: America's Choice 4 (Feb. 23,
2000) (on file with author).
42. See Reference Paper to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 30, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 [hereinafter Reference Paper of
the Basic Telecommunications Agreement]; see WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications, Note by the Chairman, Revision, Notes for Scheduling Basic
Telecom Services Commitments, S/GBT/W/2/Rev.1 (Jan. 16, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354,
371 (1997).
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communication sectors are included, but does not identify those
that are excluded. This raises the potential for China to limit
foreign investment in specified areas, making exceptions at will.
The BTA covers "basic telecommunications," which includes lo-
cal, long distance, and international services, for public and non-
public uses, offered through any technology, such as cable, wire-
less, or satellite, on a facilities basis or by resale.43 Specific
technologies included in basic service should be outlined in
China's "schedule," an itemized compilation of trade terms that
countries file with the WTO and agree to maintain.44 As a WTO
member China will open its telecommunications service market
to foreign investment in a number of important respects.
In the area of paging and value-added services, China will
permit thirty percent foreign ownership upon accession, forty-
nine percent after one year, and fifty percent two years after ac-
cession. Value-added services include e-mail, voice mail, online
information and database retrieval, facsimile, and online infor-
mation services. 45
China will permit twenty-five percent foreign ownership in
mobile services on accession, thirty-five percent after one year,
and a forty-nine percent foreign ownership share three years af-
ter accession. 46 Mobile services include voice and data, ana-
logue/digital cellular, and PCS services. 47
China will allow twenty-five percent foreign ownership of
its domestic and international service three years after acces-
sion, thirty-five percent after five years, and forty-nine percent
foreign ownership six years after accession. Telecommunica-
tions services open for investment include voice, packet-
43. Id. A Facilities based carrier "owns most of its own facilities . . . such as
Bell Atlantic." NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 340 (16th ed. 2000). A Resale car-
rier is "a long distance company that does not own its transmission lines . . . but
buys them from other carriers." Id. at 746.
44. China committed itself to technology-neutral scheduling. W.H. Clear Win
Memo, supra note 23, at 37; cf Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications
Agreement, supra note 42, at Note by Chairman. Basic Telecom includes local, long
distance and international services for public and non-public use, provided by facili-
ties basis or resale and any means of technology (e.g. cable, wireless, satellites). Id.
45. Agreement on Market Access, supra note 21; see China Online, China's
Mobile Phone Market After WTO Entry (September 29, 2000), at
http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/telecom/currentnews/secure/c00092955.asp.
46. European Commission, supra note 3. The European Union improved on the
United States-China agreement by negotiating a more aggressive implementation
timeline with China. This then resulted in better terms applicable to all members
including the United States. Supra note 22.
47. Agreement on Market Access, supra note 21.
2002]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
switched, circuit-switched, and facsimile services. 48
Notably, European Union negotiations achieved an acceler-
ated timeline for opening the mobile market, shaving two years
from the five-year compromise negotiated by the United States
months earlier.49 The improved terms allow foreigners to invest
in mobile services immediately upon accession and reach forty-
nine percent ownership in three years. The terms of the United
States-China agreement would have postponed even minimal
investment until one year after accession and prevented forty-
nine ownership for five years.50
B. WTO PRINCIPLES: CHINA'S COMMITMENTS
China's specified market access commitments supplement
the core principles of the WTO. The WTO is a rule-based inter-
national body with basic tenets that each member has agreed to
uphold. To resolve complaints of noncompliance, the WTO's
Dispute Resolution Mechanism acts as a judicial organ to inter-
pret and enforce members' commitments. It is this principle of
judicial review that has many investors excited. Though inves-
tors have no private right of action, the dispute resolution
mechanism provides investors with an extra layer of security,
lessening the risk of flagrant violations in a country with an un-
derdeveloped legal system.
Four overarching agreements embody the commitments of
WTO members.51  The WTO's most basic commitments are
found in Annex 1,52 which includes the GATT for the trade of
48. Id. All geographic restrictions will be eliminated the same year the equity
percentage reaches its maximum allotment. Id.
49. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
325 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; see also
GATS, Most-Favored Nation Treatment, part II, art. II; China Online, supra note
45; European Commission, EU-China WTO Accession Negotiations, Overview of
China's Economic Reforms and WTO Negotiations, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/china/chr.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2001).
50. Agreement on Market Access, supra note 21; see also Geoff Winestock,
China, EU Gain an Edge in WTO Deal: Three Major Concessions For U.S. Involve
Retail, Insurance and Telecom, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2000, at A30 (quoting EU offi-
cials saying that the "accelerated timetable will allow dominant EU companies [such
as Nokia Corp. and Ericsson] to expand in China at a time when the industry is tak-
ing off fast and before U.S. companies can catch up").
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112.
52. GATT, supra note 7, at Annex IA.
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goods and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
for services.5 3 GATT governs the trade of telecommunications
equipment, but the more lucrative investment involves tele-
communications services governed by the principles of GATS.54
1. GATS
GATS requires commitments of Transparency and Most Fa-
vored Nation treatment from all WTO members, and elicits spe-
cific sectoral commitments related to Market Access and Na-
tional Treatment from individual nations. These commitments
are outlined in Member's Schedules and were the focus of bilat-
eral accession negotiations in which China made concessions to
other nations to achieve their approval for WTO membership.
a. Transparency
Amid negotiations for a new international trading system,
the concept of transparency in GATT 1994 first appeared in
GATT 1947 as the publication requirement. The same year of
GATT 1947 negotiations, the United States adopted the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, introducing public participation into
federal regulatory agency rulemaking.5 5 Without apparent con-
troversy, GATT 1947 signatories incorporated a State Depart-
ment document entitled "Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations" as the publication requirement of Article X
of GATT 1947, which became the transparency requirement of
GATT 1994.56 The transparency requirement that requires in-
ternational access to and awareness of member countries' do-
mestic law stems from public notice tenents of American law.5 7
Transparency more closely resembles its American adminis-
53. GATS, supra note 49, at Annex lB.
54. MILTON MUELLER & ZIXIANG TAN, CHINA IN THE INFORMATION AGE 105
(1997). Even the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will gradually eliminate
loans to telecom projects in China because they believe the telecom sector is profit-
able enough to attract foreign investment. Id. at 108.
55. Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3 (1998).
56. See GATT, supra note 7, at art. X; see also WTO Agreement supra note 4,
Art. X; U.S. Dep't. of State, Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (1946). Unlike other articles of original American pro-
posals for international trade regulation that involved considerable compromise, Ar-
ticle X "was not altered nor were any interpretive notes required." Ostry, supra note
55, at 3-5.
57. Ostry, supra note 55, at 11.
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trative law roots today than when it originated. The creation of
the WTO vastly expanded the concept of transparency from its
early, minor role in assisting the tariff bargaining process as Ar-
ticle X of GATT 1947.58 The publication requirement became es-
sential to the evidentiary requirements of the WTO's Dispute
Resolution Mechanism.5 9 The transparency requirement in Ar-
ticle X of GATT 1947, of which China was an original signatory,
appears significantly more demanding today.60
American administrative law requires that regulatory
agencies publicize their actions, offer the public notice and
comment opportunities, and subject themselves to judicial re-
view. 61 The American system is designed to encourage signifi-
cant transparency, and all Western countries developed similar
administrative laws after World War II. China lacks the same
domestic publication requirements, or transparency, in its gov-
ernment.6 2 Thus transparency, a basic tenent of American law
that has become the underpinning of international trade policy,
will present a challenge to an underdeveloped Chinese legal sys-
tem.
b. Nondiscrimination: MFN and National Treatment
Two principles embodied in GATS ensure that member
countries provide nondiscriminatory access to their respective
markets. 6 The Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation of GATS
Article II requires that each member provide "treatment no less
favourable than that it accords like services and service suppli-
58. Id. at 6-7, 11. GATT 1947 proved ineffective at resolving disputes, but its
principles launched efforts to create an international body for world trade (the WTO)
and international trade policy based on rules and remedies. Id. at 3, 6, 9.
59. The GATT lacked the necessary teeth and its dispute settlement mecha-
nism was weak, which led to its restructuring. Id. at 6-7, 11.
60. Id. at 12 (analyzing how transparency requirements are more stringent un-
der the GATTI current iteration); cf Nextlinx Corporation Website 11, (on file with
author) (identifying a 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access
signed between China and the United States committing China to improve the
transparency of its trade regime.)
61. Ostry, supra note 55, at 2-5.
62. Id. at 4-5. All Western countries developed administrative laws to establish
a procedure for bureaucratic governance due to the expanded role of government fol-
lowing World War I. Id. Contrary to parliamentary systems, which are based on a
legislative primacy and a strong executive power, the United States' three-branch
government further delegates to regulatory agencies with their own judicial and leg-
islative powers. Id.
63. Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive Carrier to the WTO: A
Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998,
51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111, 169 (1998).
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ers of any other country."6 Exceptions are granted under speci-
fied terms if WTO members review and agree to the exceptions.
Similarly, the National Treatment provision of GATS Arti-
cle XVII obligates a member country to afford "treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own [domestic] like services and
service suppliers. '65 Unlike MFN, this provision permits mem-
bers to qualify this blanket provision with conditions specified in
their own Schedules. Members are encouraged, but not re-
quired, to equalize service competition by keeping terms consis-
tent.66 Foreign suppliers may be treated differently but not dis-
advantaged in their efforts to compete with another foreign or
domestic supplier.67
c. Market Access
Specific Market Access commitments of Article XVI made
by each member country must be specified in the members'
Schedules. Each member must grant the other member coun-
tries "treatment no less favourable than that provided for under
the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified. '68 In
those service sectors where a member commits to Market Ac-
cess, members cannot adopt specified limitations unless such
limitations are detailed in their Schedule. The Market Access
commitment of "treatment no less favourable" seemingly incor-
porates both the National Treatment and Most Favored Nation
requirements to give all foreign competitors equal opportunities
and identical treatment to that of domestic suppliers. Thus,
unless exceptions are stated in a member's Schedule, the Mar-
ket Access and National Treatment provisions both afford for-
eign companies the same right of ownership and investment as
a country's nationals enjoy.
2. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement
Two years after negotiations concluded in the establishment
of the WTO, the Reference Paper created within the 1997 Basic
64. GATS, supra note 49, at art. II.
65. Id. at art. XVII.
66. 'Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or
service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or services suppliers of
any other Member." Id.
67. Spiwak, supra note 63, at 169.
68. GATS, supra note 49, at Art. XVI.
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Telecommunications Agreement established a broad range of
"pro-competitive" market access commitments for services in the
telecommunications industry service sector.69 Previous WTO
negotiations only addressed access to existing service and net-
works by users;70 however, the Reference Paper introduced the
ability to sell services and enter telecommunications markets.
China has agreed to principles set out in the Reference Paper,
which include competition safeguards, interconnection, trans-
parency of licensing criteria, independence of the regulator, allo-
cation of scarce resources, and universal service.7 1
Basic telecommunications was targeted for sector-specific
negotiation due to its complex domestic legal structures, highly
regulated business environment, economic importance, capital-
intensive nature, and national security importance within do-
mestic infrastructure.7 2 Many telecommunications infrastruc-
tures are nationally owned, highly regulated monopolies.73
Not every member country signed on to the Reference Pa-
per. Out of 132 WTO members, 69 members made concessions,
and only 54 members, including the United States, which was
the "driving force" behind the agreement, agreed to some or all
of its principles.7 4 For those that agreed to be bound by its
tenents, the agreement is fully enforceable under the WTO Dis-
pute Mechanism.7 5
a. Anti-Competitive Practices
The Reference Paper prohibits certain anti-competitive
practices. The practices prohibited include cross-subsidization,
using a competitor's information with anti-competitive results,
69. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, supra note
42; see also Spiwak, supra note 63, at 171.
70. GATS, supra note 49, at Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunica-
tions (requiring nondiscriminatory access to networks, transparency, and reasonable
access to particular service sectors set in a Member's Schedule).
71. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, supra note
42; see also Spiwak, supra note 63, at 171.
72. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 7, at 243.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45-48, 246-48; see also Spiwak, supra note 63, at 171, 176. Three
countries agreed to adopt some amount in the future; eight agreed to adopt some
amount; and three stated they would make no additional regulatory commitments.
Id.
75. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement supra note
42, at 2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement; see also Spiwak, supra note 63, at
172.
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and withholding commercially relevant information from other
service suppliers regarding facilities necessary to provide ser-
vice.76 Members may take "appropriate measures" to prevent
suppliers from engaging in these practices.7 7 The Reference Pa-
per includes a preventative component, requiring each member
country to establish an independent regulator that is authorized
to make impartial decisions for suppliers of basic telecommuni-
cation services.78
To encourage the widespread dissemination of telecommu-
nications, the Reference Paper does not consider universal ser-
vice policies 79 per se anti-competitive if "they are administered
in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral
manner and are not more burdensome than necessary." 0 China
can define its own terms of universal service and within those
limits can cross-subsidize to benefit high-cost rural carriers by
burdening lower-cost urban business users.
To prevent anti-competitive practices in licensing, the Ref-
erence Paper requires all terms, conditions, and timelines for
decision making to be made publicly available. All frequencies,
numbers, and rights of way must also be allocated in an objec-
tive, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner. The
public is free to inquire as to the state of any frequency not allo-
cated for government use.81
b. Interconnection
China's regulatory regime historically has been reluctant to
mandate the interconnection that the Reference Paper re-
quires.8 2 Upon accession, China must permit competitors inter-
connection with its public telecommunications networks at "any
76. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, supra note
42, at 1.2 Safeguards.
77. Id. at 1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications.
78. Id. at 5 Independent regulators.
79. Universal service is the concept given to policy promoting affordable phone
service for all at just and reasonable rates. FCC Memo, Connecting the Globe: A
Regulator's Guide to Building a Global Information Community, Universal Service,
part VI, June 16, 1999, available at http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec6.html.
80. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, supra note
42, at 3 Universal service.
81. Id. at 4 Public availability of licensing criteria; id. at 6 Allocation and use of
scarce resources.
82. See Rachelle B. Chong & Wendy Chow, Financing Telecommunications Pro-
ject in Asia: A Promising Regulatory Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 14 (1999).
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technically feasible point" under non-discriminatory terms.8 3
The interconnection rates must be nondiscriminatory, cost-
orientated, transparent, reasonable, economically feasible, and
sufficiently unbundled.84  Interconnection procedures and
agreements must be made publicly available.8 5
The interconnection obligations provide an additional ave-
nue of enforcement for violations of the GATS National Treat-
ment provision, which can be easily undermined in a member's
Schedule. The Reference Paper's obligation to provide equal in-
terconnection to all requires members to provide a foreign car-
rier with the same market access as a domestic carrier.8 6
II. CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT
A. HISTORICAL DOMINATION OF CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR BY FOREIGN INVESTORS
Foreign companies have been streaming into China to in-
vest in telecommunications since the Qing dynasty in the
1880s.8 7 China began nationalizing its telecommunications in
1908 and eventually revoked foreign ownership rights in sub-
marine cables in 1924.88 After taking control of the government
in 1949, the Communists created a state monopoly on China's
83. Reference Paper of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, supra note
42, at 2 Interconnection.
84. Id. at 2.2 (a); id. at (b).
85. Id. at 2.3 Public Availability of the procedures for interconnection negotia-
tions; id. at 2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements.
86. Spiwak, supra note 63, at 173.
87. In 1870, the Qing emperor of China permitted the British to connect five
port cities to Shanghai with submarine cables, the first telecommunications technol-
ogy. See Zhou He, A History of Telecommunications In China: Development and Pol-
icy Implications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 55, 57-58
(Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997). As a result of the Qing decree, a Danish company took the
lead, beating the British to be the first to build the lines beginning China's interna-
tional telecommunications backbone with ownership and operation in the hands of a
foreign company. Id. at 58. The British laid cables from Shanghai to Hong Kong in
1883. Id. at 58-59. In the 1880s the Danish opened China's first telephone
switchboard in Shanghai. Id. at 61. In 1901, China created the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications (MPT) and began constructing state-run telecommunica-
tions facilities between big cities with funding from the military budget, which soon
ran too low to continue. Id. at 61-63. The MPT was a hollow shell for six years. Id.
at 62-63. Four years after the MPT's creation, China, for roughly $6250, purchased
the first long-distance telephone line ever laid in China, which connected the two
main cities in northern China. Id. at 61-62.
88. Id. at 63, 65.
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telecommunications market.8 9 Shortly thereafter, insufficient
government funding made telecommunications a low priority.
Although the government succeeded in connecting most provin-
cial capitals, rural areas were left behind.90
In 1994, China made a conscious effort to begin improve-
ments in its telecommunications network.91 Long distance lines
in south and central China were so congested that only about
fifteen percent of calls were connected. 92 The intra-city success
rate was not much better, hovering around sixty percent.93 Con-
sumers could wait up to two years for the installation of a tele-
phone.94 Networks were poorly connected and increased capac-
ity was sorely needed. 95
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS
GOVERNANCE
1. Restructuring Telecommunications Governance: Ministry of
Information Industry
Today, China is spearheading a new wave of telecommuni-
cations growth, overhauling telecommunications policy and rais-
ing eyebrows around the world. In March 1998, China merged
three Ministries to create the Ministry of Information Industry
(MII).96 This restructuring of telecommunications governance is
significant for several reasons: it illustrates a significant shift in
China's telecom policy, provides clearer avenues for foreign in-
vestment, and paves the way for WTO accession. The next stage
in China's telecommunications development will include prom-
ulgation of a comprehensive telecommunications law and policy
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id. at 67, 69, 85; see also Paul S.N. Lee, Uneven Development of Telecom in
China, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 113, 121, 127 (Paul
S.N. Lee ed., 1997).





96. Morrison & Foerster LLP, China's Telecommunications Industry: The New
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and Foreign Investment Opportunities
(March 1, 1998), available at http://mofo.com/practice/ArticleDetail.cfm?
MCatID=&concentrationlD=&ID=303&Type=3. The MI1 replaced the MPT, the
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Televi-
sion (MRFT). Id.
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encouraging stability among domestic telecommunications pro-
viders that will ensure equitable competition with large foreign
telecommunications players. 97
2. Telecommunications Law
Upon WTO accession, foreign investors should expect a
gradual timeline for opening China's telecommunications ser-
vice market.98 This process will require promulgation of a com-
prehensive telecommunications law, but many drafts have been
rejected since 1980.99 However, as a result of China's recent
WTO concessions, efforts have been stepped up to regulate this
sector domestically. 100
In September 2000, China released the Telecommunications
Administration Regulations as a preview of the anticipated
comprehensive Telecommunications Law. 1° 1 The regulations di-
vide telecommunications services into "basic telecommunica-
tions" and "value-added telecommunications services." For basic
telecommunications services, the state-owned equity holding
must be at least fifty-one percent, permitting forty-nine percent
foreign ownership. 0 2 A percentage limit is not specified for
value-added services. 0 3 Telecommunications service providers
must obtain a license as either a proprietary or nonproprietary
97. China: Telecoms-What Slowdown?, CHINA ECON. REV., July 26, 2001; see
also MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at 113 (arguing that neither MPT nor MEI is
capable of competing against British Telecom, Singapore Telecom, AT&T, or MCI in
the telecom services market).
98. See China Online, Wu Jichuan: No Business Volume Limitations For For-
eign Investors in Telecom, at http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/
000926/11c00092619.asp (Sept. 26, 2000). Wu Jichuan, the Minister of MII, indi-
cated that "MII will gradually open China's telecom market." Id.
99. United States Embassy, China, New Ministry of Information Industries,
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/englishleconomics/miiweb.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2001); see also HE, supra note 87, at 77. China began drafting the Tele-
communications Law in 1980. It has gone through many drafts and has not yet been
approved as of December 2000. See id.; see also Peter Wonacott, China Maps IPO to
Gird for Foreign Telecom Invasion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000.
100. United States Dept. Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Office of Telecomm.
Technologies, China /MII Submits Draft Telecom Regulations to Council, Asia Tele-
comm. Newsletter available at http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/ot/newsarch.nsf/
64e14978f46d75a18525667f004cc7a6/543732832cc3aa098525697c0052e18d!OpenDo
cument (September 8, 2000) [hereinafter MII Memo].
101. China Legal Change, The Regulations of the People's Republic of China on
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network.10 4 MII retains authority to decide who can set up a
proprietary network. Therefore, China still controls which for-
eigners may sell service to the public on their own telecommuni-
cations infrastructure rather than on resale. 105
The regulations also require foreign investors providing
telecom services to partner with Chinese companies in joint ven-
tures. 106 The Chinese investor must appoint the Chairman of
the Board of Directors and recommend the General Manager for
the joint venture. 107 Chinese authorities retain flexibility to
permit only those foreigners that demonstrate "sound perform-
ance and experience in the industry" to invest in telecom ser-
vices. 08
There is also a financial restriction placed on those busi-
nesses that can enter the market. Only the foreign firms inter-
ested in China's "infrastructure telecommunications business"
who have made $10 billion annually over the last two years can
enter the market. 10 9 The prohibitive clause, which the head of
the M11 deems "trivial," bars all but a dozen or so of the world's
largest phone companies from the Chinese market."0) Further
limiting foreign firms investment opportunities, the regulations
only permit those qualified foreign firms to partner with state-
owned Chinese firms with annual revenues of $360 million."'
3. The First Competitor: China Telecom Meets China Unicom
China realizes that established domestic telecommunica-
tions companies are an important factor in establishing a com-
petitive environment for foreign investment. 12 Though one
104. MII Memo, supra note 100; CompetitionNOW, Telecom Regulations Set in
China (Sept. 22, 2000), at httpJ/www.competitionnow.com/ArchivesDetail.
asp?objectId=33218. Proprietary network operators own their own infrastructure,
while nonproprietary networks are resellers. Id.





110. Matt Forney, China Fails to Clarify Proposals Limiting Foreign Firms' Ac-
cess to Telecom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2000. The article quotes Wu Jichuan as say-
ing, "Government regulations on foreign access to the telecom market won't touch on
such trivial details and specific issues." Id.
111. Id. "[Wu Jichuan] noted that the new rules would not include any clauses
to impose annual operational revenue restrictions on foreign investors. However,
China will 'have qualifications for those who want to participate in the sector after it
becomes a WTO member.'" China Online, supra note 98.
112. Tony Munroe, It's a Family Affair: China Telecom in Talks to Buy Networks
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Chinese official estimates that this domestic development could
take upwards of twenty years, the WTO will require China to
open certain markets in less than a year. 113
China Telecom is the largest telecommunications company
in China. It was the first state monopoly of telecommunications
in fixed-line network service under the control of the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), one of the three
merged MII ministries. 114 Another of the merged ministries, the
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), created a second state-
owned telecom service provider in 1994. That provider, China
Unicom, successfully signed over forty agreements with foreign
companies in its first year of existence, arranging indirect joint
ventures in the telecommunications equipment markets and us-
ing the funding to gain a foothold in the growing mobile phone
market." 5 China banned these investments in 1998 declaring
the underlying contracts illegal, and required China Unicom to
refund foreigners' investments to companies such as Motorola,
Inc. and Sprint Corp."16
From Parent, Reuters, June 26, 2000 (noting that Chinese telecom companies' suc-
cess depends on having a critical mass carrier in place well in advance of foreigners
coming into the market).
113. MI Memo, supra note 100. Minister Wu Jichuan has estimated that the
development of domestic companies capable of competing with large foreign telecom
companies could take twenty years. Id.
114. Chew Boon Chuan et al., Telecommunications and Information Technology,
in BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN NORTHEASTERN CHINA 241, 244 (John J Williams et
al. eds. 1999); see also China Online, China Telecom Hankering to Become 3rd Mo-
bile Player (Sept. 25 2000), http://chinaonline.com/industry/telecom/
currentnews/secure/C00092209.asp.
115. M11 Memo, supra note 100; Steven Yeong, China: The Commercial and
Regulatory Environment, Datapro (April 15, 1999), at
http://res.ufgartner.ufl.edu/datapro/3806-1.htm (stating that China Unicorn had
forty-six joint venture contracts); see also Chuan, supra note 114, at 244-45 (noting
that China Unicorn won approval from the State Council to be the second national
network in 1994); Co's Angle for China Internet Market, Associated Press, Nov. 3,
1999 (stating that over forty joint ventures in China Unicorn were used to finance
mobile network expansion).
Although Chinese law prohibits China Unicom's partners from securing an
equity position in the projects, foreign partners are allowed to first form
joint ventures with local partners that, in turn, fund the Unicorn projects
for a set rate of return. For example, Sprint and Sumitomo are partners in
a joint venture with a local company known as Tianjin Global Communica-
tions. Tianjin Global is China Unicom's partner in a fixed-line business in
the City of Tianjin.
Morrison & Foerster, supra note 96.
116. Some sources identify this refund as $1.4 or $1.5 billion. See Associated
Press, supra note 115; see also Matt Forney & Sara Webb, China Phone Firm Re-
mains Ensnared By Bureaucracy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2000 (stating that those con-
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China Unicom's ability to induce competition is an indicator
of the potential competitive market for China's telecommunica-
tions services. In wireless services, China Unicom opened com-
peting cellular phone service in China's four largest cities, and
forced the MPT to slash cellular phone prices by twenty percent
and waive start-up fees.' 17 In domestic wireline, the govern-
ment permitted China Unicom to charge a lower connection fee,
which brought down the cost of phone installation from a na-
tional average of $480, to $240 in 1997 and $120 in 1998.118
China Telecom is under pressure to reduce service charges on
alternative communications technologies such as call-back,
internet telephony, resale of leased lines, and satellite transmis-
sions. 119
Realistically, China Unicorn is hardly a true competitor to
the state's larger mobile phone companies. China Mobile owns
seventy-three percent of the market, and China Telecom holds a
virtual monopoly on wireline with a greater than ninety-nine
percent market share.1 20 However, even though its market
shares remain small at twenty-six percent and less than one
percent respectively, China Unicorn signifies the potentially
dramatic impact of competition to come.
tracts deemed illegal had been tacitly approved by top government officials). Singa-
pore Technologies, which invested $48 million was, embroiled in proceedings against
China Unicorn to reclaim the value of a paging system it financed and remains un-
satisfied with China Unicom's offer to return the investment with interest. Id.; See
also Yeong, supra note 115 (listing some of the investors as Motorola Inc., Sprint
Corp., Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and Sumitomo Corp.).
117. Chuan, supra note 114, at 244; see also Forney & Webb, supra note 116
(stating that China Unicorn charged China Mobile with illegally matching its lower
prices and waiving start-up fees for those customers who switch from China Unicom
to China Mobile).
118. MII Memo, supra note 100, at 3. In 1998 installation began at $226 and fell
to a maximum installation charge of $120 after March 1, 1998. CHINA ONLINE, Tele-
corn Modernization Faces Challenges in China (Oct. 10, 2000); see also Forney &
Webb, supra note 116. The competitive edge was not simply the result of competi-
tion. The Chinese government permitted China Unicom to set prices slightly lower
than those charged by China Mobile, the largest state-run mobile phone company
with nearly ninety percent of the country's customers. Thus, China Unicorn was still
dependent on the government's ability to set prices. Id.
119. MII Memo, supra note 100, at 4
120. Id. at 3; see also Forney & Webb, supra note 116 (noting that China Mobile
has nearly ninety percent of China's mobile phone users connected); see also Hui
Yuk-Min, Beijing Must Step Up Efforts to Break Sector's Monopoly, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 2001 (indicating that China Unicom's market share of the
mobile phone business is twenty-six percent); see also PEOPLE'S DAILY, Scheme De-
vised to Break Up Monopoly, Oct. 16, 2001 (citing MII statistics that indicate China
Telecom owns over ninety-nine percent of the market).
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Recently, with unexpected urgency, Beijing's leadership
mandated the break up of China Telecom's monopoly in the
fixed-line sector, which will consequently shift market share
when implemented.'21 As WTO accession nears, splitting China
Telecom is the most recent indicator of Beijing's plans to rapidly
establish domestic competition in preparation for foreign in-
vestment.
4. Inducing Competition
In a massive restructuring that began and continues as we
go to press, the hundred percent state owned monopoly China
Telecom will split into northern and southern regional providers
and merge with a smaller provider of data services in the
north.' Signs of this evolution began in March 1999, when
China Telecom split into four competing service units: fixed-line
telephone (China Telecom), mobile (China Mobile), paging
(given to China Unicom), and satellite (ChinaSat).123 Rather
than stirring competition, critics suggested this split would cre-
ate new monopolies in each service area, or "supercarriers" sur-
rounded by a competitive fringe.124
China Telecom and China Unicom were the only significant
local and long-distance fixed-line providers until China Railcom
announced it would enter the fixed-line business in March
2001.125 China Telecom owns the nationwide fiber optic cable
network and China's principal computer network, ChinaNet. 126
121. Leslie Chang & Matt Pottinger, China Telecom, Once Split, Will Service
Separate Regions; IPO May Be Speeded, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001 (noting that the
State Council essentially sidelined the powerful telecom regulator, MII, in making
the breakup decision itself).
122. Id. China Telecom will merge with China Netcom to become China Netcom
Corp. in the north. Id.
123. Zhao Huanxin, Telecom Needs Competition, China Daily, June 10, 1999 (on
file with author); see also Letter from Daniel Brody, Managing Director, U.S. Infor-
mation Technology Office, to Rachael Abramson (Nov. 25, 2000) (on file with au-
thor).
124. Huanxin, supra note 123.
125. Michael Ma, Railcom Launches Phone Service Offer, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, March 3, 2001. China Railcom is a spin-off from the Ministry of
Railways and already has an elaborate communications system for railway use, from
which the MII will allow it to offer local, long distance, data, and Internet service at
discounted prices to compete with China Telecom. Id.
126. Jianhong Wang, Breakup of China Telecom, U.S. & Foreign Commercial
Service (May 2000). As of April 24, 2000, China Telecom had fixed assets of over $48
billion and net assets over $24 billion. At the end of 1999, China Telecom had 110
million telephone subscribers. Id.
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China Unicom has been the only fully-licensed telecommunica-
tions operator in China able to provide fixed, mobile, data, satel-
lite, international gateways, Internet backbone, and any other
service. 127 The merger between China Telecom and China Uni-
com's patron ministries, which created the MII, has largely
solved interconnection problems between the two, however new
entrants are likely to face similar interconnection issues. 128
Critics suggest that any united front could pose difficulties for
new competitors.
China has two wireless providers, China Unicom and China
Mobile, but indicators suggest new licenses will be awarded
soon. The wireless market in China is the world's biggest in
number of subscribers; its growth rate was reported at seventy-
eight percent at the end of 2000.129 Recent contracts with Erics-
son, Lucent, Motorola, and Nortel provide investment for China
Unicom's plans to build the world's largest code division multi-
ple access (CDMA) mobile phone network for fifty million sub-
scribers by the end of 2004.130 China Unicorn is the baby
brother of China Mobile, which has the dominant market share;
however, growth rates and government restructuring efforts
could quickly even out the playing field. 131
China Unicom and China Mobile have held initial public of-
ferings (IPO) on the Hong Kong stock market. China Unicorn
sold over twenty percent of its market share on both the Hong
127. Letter from Daniel Brody, Managing Director, U.S. Information Technology
Office, to Rachael Abramson (Nov. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
128. Sarah Lubman, Beijing Still Far From Open Internet Access: WTO Member-
ship May Mean Progress, But Advisers Say Don't Expect Miracles, ASIA REPORT Nov.
24, 1999. Such interconnection problems plagued Sprint's $30 million fixed-line in-
vestment in China Unicom in 1998, when China Telecom refused to connect Sprint's
network to its own network, preventing subscribers from calling anyone outside
their chosen network. Id. The problem was rectified in July 2000. MII Memo, supra
note 100; see also Yeong, supra note 115.
129. Peter Wonacott, China Maps IPO to Gird for Foreign Telecom Invasion,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000 (insert); see also China Unicorn First Half Profit to Surge,
ASIAPORT DAILY NEWS, Sept. 12, 2001.
130. China Unicom's Interim Profit Soars, ASIAPORT DAILY NEWS, Sept. 14,
2001. China Mobile and China Unicom also have GSM networks-- the largest in the
world-- although there has been a push for CDMA rollout in recent months. Home
Grown 3GAge Faces Tough Future, ASIAPORT DAILY NEWS, Sept. 12, 2001.
131. China Unicom First Half Profit to Surge, ASIAPORT DAILY NEWS, Sept. 12,
2001; see also Blaise Zerega, Communications Watch: China braces for telecom
breakup Tech Soundings: Chinese startups and overseas investors line up as the Peo-
ple's Republic plans the deregulation of telephony services, REDHERRING.COM, Sept,
17, 2001. China Mobile had thirty-eight million mobile users by the end of 1999,
equaling ninety percent of the country's total. Wang, supra note 126, at 3.
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Kong and New York Stock Exchange to raise $5.65 billion.132
China Telecom is expected to announce the next telecom IPO
despite repeated delays.13 Smaller state-run companies are also
vying for a piece of the pie.13 4 Created at the behest of Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji, and boasting Premier Jiang Zemin's eldest
son as a director, Netcom was the upstart positioned to upset
China Telecom's monopoly in data broadband communications
before announcement of the merger between northern China
Telecom and China Netcom. 135 China Netcom built a 5300 mile
fiber optic network and was expected to launch a bid for a long
distance license and a mobile license. 136 China Netcom will now
incorporate China Telecom's northern fixed-line equipment al-
ready in place into its business plan, and will be in a position to
compete with southern China Telecom for a mobile license when
China issues a third.
1 37
China Jitong is another developing player. As the sister
startup to China Unicom, China Jitong had a six year head
start, but suffered from poor management and has been slow to
take any initial steps. 138 Like China Netcom, China Jitong
provides data broadband communications, but its operating
costs are funneled into leasing capacity from China Telecom be-
cause it has few transmission lines of its own.139 China's broad-
band market is still in its infancy, but China Telecom, China
Unicom, China Mobile, China Netcom, and China Jitong all run
competing Internet protocol (IP) phone services. 140 IP services
will be divvied up according to new merger plans.
Additional promise for competition in the wake of China
Telecom's split could include additional mergers, reports have
speculated.' If merger occurs, and the remaining merged tele-
132. Wonacott, supra note 129.
133. Chang & Pottinger, supra note 121.
134. Joe Leahy, China: Foreigners Eye the China Pie, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000.
135. Chang & Pottinger, supra note 121; see also Answering the Call, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 26, 2001; see also Michael Dwyer, Murdoch In Step With
China, AUSTL. FIN. REVIEW, Sept. 8, 2001.
136. Answering the Call, supra note 135; Leahy, supra note 134; Letter from
Andrew Batson, Strategic Intelligence, to Rachael Abramson (Nov. 14, 2000) (on file
with author).
137. PEOPLE'S DAILY, supra note 120.
138. Leahy, supra note 134.
139. Xiao Hou, Telecom Firm Eyes SOE Backing, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 3, 2001.
140. Leahy, supra note 134.
141. Chang & Pottinger, supra note 121; see also Lester J. Gesteland, State
Council Approves China Telecom Breakup, Sector Consolidation, CHINAONLINE
NEWS, Oct. 16, 2001. Rumors suggest China Unicom will merge with China Railcom
to become China Unicorn Group and China Mobile will merge with China Jitong to
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com companies are fully licensed to provide fixed, data, and mo-
bile services, those companies with a full spectrum of services
might attract market share more equally and jump start true
domestic competition without further government guidance.
III. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CHINESE LAW AND
WTO COMPLIANCE
A. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
To sustain any growth, telecommunications companies
positioning themselves domestically in China need foreign in-
vestment. Investors want transparency in law, to measure the
risk they are willing to take by their legal limits. As rapidly as
China introduces foreign competition, China is creating the
rules of the game and causing mixed feelings for investors who
are weighing their risk. China's legal system resembles a civil
system, based on written statutes and not common law. To at-
tract foreign investment, China began to enact laws in 1979 af-
ter signing a bilateral Agreement with the United States.
142
China first enacted the Joint Venture Law and Foreign Trade
Law granting legal protection to both state and privately owned
Western businesses. 143 In 1993 China continued this trend by
promulgating the Company Law to impose a uniform standard
of corporate behavior and outline the rights of shareholders.
14
The importance of law in China's economic development
achieved widespread philosophical acceptance when China
adopted the concept of a "socialist market economy" in an
amendment to its Constitution in 1993.145
China has also looked to the law of other countries for guid-
ance in developing its own. However, the cross-cultural transfer
of legal language does not result in a perfect translation. While
become China Mobile Group. Id.
142. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4651;
see also Benjamin M. Vandegrift, Making Deals In China: What You'll Find; How It's
Done, 8 Bus. L. TODAY 40, 43.
143. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 14, at 1342.
144. Vandegrift, supra note 142, at 43.
145. Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Decision of the CPC Central
Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market
Economic Structure, Nov. 14, 1993; see also Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal
Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 127 (1999).
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familiar to foreign investors, the legal terminology used is not
central to the Chinese experience and is often interpreted differ-
ently.146 For instance, there is only one Chinese word for the
English concepts of "legal system/rule of law" and "rule by
law."147 In Chinese, the concept of democracy imbued in the
former is also interpreted as autocracy, as conveyed by the lat-
ter. In a democracy, 'rule' is a noun and a safeguard belonging
to every individual. In an autocracy, 'rule' is a verb providing a
ruler with the effective means to hold onto power. In the above
two phrases, 'law' either acts as the central, operative word as
the modifier of a noun, or is objectified as the verb's instrument
to describe the verb's source of power.
Traditionally, the political philosophy of Legalism in China
was synonymous with totalitarianism because it served as a
leader's instrument for controlling the masses.148 Though Legal-
ism is largely considered extinct in modern Chinese philosophy,
the inherent conflict in the very term for the most basic inter-
pretation of the role of law in Chinese society is evident in its
multiplicity of translation.
Legal concepts incompatible with a civilization are not in-
ternalized and not enforceable. 149 For instance, in China, law
students are taught to memorize and not theorize. Law is the
study of the rules that exist, not what could be argued to exist.
Traditionally, China has not been a litigious society.150 Disputes
should be dissolved, rather than resolved, according to Confu-
cian teaching, the underpinning of the Chinese value system. 151
Confucianism requires submission of individual desire to the
good of the group. 15 2 As such, harmony is virtuous and litigation
146. See A. Dan Tarlock, Hong Kong: One Country, Two Systems or Two Coun-
ties, One System, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 139, 146 (Frederick M.
Abbott ed., 1998).
147. Chen, supra note 145, at 135 (discussing the multiplicity of meaning in the
Chinese term "fazhi"); see also Ostry, supra note 55, at 14 (commenting that Chi-
nese leaders seem to mean "rule by law" rather than "rule of law" when they speak
of accomplishments in creating legal institutions).
148. "Contemporary Chinese scholars are almost unanimous in rejecting the al-
leged equivalence between Legalism and the rule of law." Chen, supra note 145, at
129.
149. Id. at 134; see also C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role For Non-
governmental Organizations, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 373 (2000) (suggesting that the
goal of reform is to "internalize into legal workers a sense of moral responsibility to
act in ways that affirm the rule of law").
150. Vandegrift, supra note 142, at 45.
151. Tarlock, supra note 146, at 146. Dissolving a dispute is a Confucian notion.
152. See Chen, supra note 145, at 129-30, for a discussion of the roles of Confu-
cianism and Legalism in ancient China and today.
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humiliating and uncertain. 153 In fact, only recently have Chi-
nese citizens been permitted to sue their employers and the gov-
ernment.154
Today, ideological discourse in China increasingly invokes
Marxism, which teaches that the economics of a society deter-
mines the stability of a political system, and thus provides lead-
ers with a source of legitimacy. 155 Law is the key to China's
long-term stability and prosperity, and a vehicle to escape the
historical dynastic cycles in which each regime has traditionally
declined and fallen. 156 China's WTO accession is affirmative ac-
ceptance of such a rule-based system. 15 7
B. NON-TRANSPARENCY IN CHINESE LAW
Sweeping legal reform rides the undercurrent of China's
problems. China will resist any transparency requirement that
threatens to weaken the regime. Balance of power is conceptu-
ally absent from Chinese politics and consciously ignored. 158
Administrative law facilitates effective balance of power be-
tween arms of government, and thus exemplifies the basic dif-
ference between American and Chinese law.159 Thus, China will
not expand its transparency requirement to the exhaustive
length expected by the United States.
Chinese law is highly generalized and lacks procedural
guidelines. 160 The bureaucrats who implement the laws have a
high degree of discretion discretion. There is no right of public
comment or consultation for suggestions when drafting regula-
tions, especially at the provincial level. Laws for foreign trade
are published in the Gazette, but local laws are not included.
Normative documents are a pervasive genre of law used exten-
153. Tarlock, supra note 146, at 146; see also Chen, supra note 145, at 129.
154. Catharin Dalpino, Brookings Institution, Remarks at the Brookings Press
Briefing, The China Trade Vote (May 23, 2000).
155. U.S. Embassy Beijing, China's Top Worries: Lagging Political Reform, Cor-
ruption, Environment (May 2000), at http'//www.usembassy/china.org.cn/
english/sandt/poll-reform.htm (citing a prominent Chinese academic who said if the
Party can gradually accept democratic reforms, it can continue in power indefi-
nitely). "Chinese ideological discourse increasingly refers to Marx and Engels and
much less to Lenin and Mao Zedong." Id.
156. Chen, supra note 145, at 138-39.
157. Mastel, supra note 9, at 991 (stating that the WTO is the "ultimate rule-
based international institution").
158. Ostry, supra note 55, at 15.
159. Id.
160. Lee, supra note 149 at 368.
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sively by local administrative bodies, but are not binding on
those bureaucrats who use them.161  There is limited
governmental oversight of local legislative and administrative
action, which causes rampant local protectionism and no effec-
tive transparency. 162 These traits will not mesh well with the
WTO generally.
The WTO requires a single access point for Chinese law and
regulations. 163 China must streamline the multilayered com-
plexity that plagues its present-day legal system. 1' 4 Otherwise,
the lack of transparency threatens to frustrate efforts to secure
reliable information for the evidentiary-intensive WTO Dispute
Mechanism.165
WTO accession encourages future strides in China's legal
transparency to improve access to distribution channels and
market liberalization. The United States, however, should not
expect a level of transparency from China that the WTO itself
does not honor. There is inadequate publication of WTO meet-
ings and pleadings, and decisions of the Dispute Mechanism are
released months after they are decided. 166 As long as transpar-
ency problems plague the WTO, there should be little condem-
nation for China, which is making remarkable strides towards
building a new legal system.
161. Ostry, supra note 55, at 13.
Below the formal system of laws and administrative regulations is another
body of 'rules,' termed normative documents. These documents are used
extensively by administrative bodies, especially at the local
level.. Whether they are legal or not (and no clear ruling exists), they are
not published and are probably not binding on the bureaucrats that use
them.
Id.
162. The majority of judges are appointed without prior legal experience. See
Lee, supra note 149, at 368. See William P. Alford, "Seek Truths From Facts" -
Especially When They Are Unpleasant: American's Understanding of Chinese Efforts
at Law Reform, in CHINESE LAW: BASIC CONCEPTS OF CHINESE LAw 295 (Tahirih V.
Lee ed., 1997) (for a discussion of the inadequacies of the Chinese judiciary).
163. Ostry, supra note 55, at 13.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Id. at 19; see also Brad Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the
World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369, 387 (2000).
166. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Debate
at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 94 (2001); see also Remarks by Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Professor of Law, University of Georgia, to Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law, Dispute Resolution and the WTO (Sept. 20,
2000). Prof. Schoenbaum deemed the WTO litigation process "very secretive," noting
that neither the process nor written pleadings are open to the public thereby creat-
ing an atmosphere of distrust whereby people doubt the legitimacy of decisions. Id.
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C. RESTRICTIONS ON MARKET ACCESS
China's market access commitments reflect protectionist
tendencies, but also prospective progression. The November
1999 United States-China Bilateral Agreement was classified
until March 2000.167 The final agreement was released with
strike-outs and pen-ins that show negotiated additions and al-
terations, indicating that disagreement in telecommunications
negotiations centered on foreign ownership percentages and the
timeline for gradual entry.168 The final agreement for
telecommunications includes two categories: value-added
services and basic telecommunication services.
Value-added services include e-mail, voice mail, value-
added facsimile services, and online information and/or data
processing. 169 The agreement permits thirty percent foreign in-
vestment in joint ventures within China's three major cities
upon accession. Negotiators' alternations to the next step,
which expands foreign investment to fourteen additional cities,
indicate a change in the timeline and percent, from thirty-five
two years later, to forty-nine percent one year later. 170 The third
stage initially permitted fifty-one percent foreign ownership four
years later, but negotiators refigured the third stage to include
fifty percent ownership two years later with no geographic re-
strictions. 171
Basic Telecommunication Services include paging, mobile,
and domestic and international voice and data services. 172 The
paging service sector's percentage ownership and timeline are
identical to the terms and corrections made in negotiations for
value-added services. Mobile services include voice and data,
analog/digital and PCS services. The agreement offers twenty-
five percent foreign investment opportunities in joint ventures
in China's three major cities one year after accession, thirty-five
percent in fourteen additional cities after three years, and forty-
nine percent anywhere in China after five years. 173 There was
no apparent disagreement over these figures.
The basic telecommunication services identified as "domes-
tic and international services" include voice, packet and circuit-






173. Agreement on Market Access, supra note 21.
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switched data transmission, and facsimile services. 174 This cate-
gory seemingly includes any telecommunications service not
specifically mentioned, such as domestic wireline Plain Old
Telephone Service (POTS). Under the same three-step geo-
graphic gradation, twenty-five percent foreign investment is
permitted three years after accession, thirty-five percent after
five years, and forty-nine percent after six years. Foreigners
must wait three years to invest in telephony, other than that
specified as a mobile or value-added service. 175
Interestingly, a correction on the agreement includes a
hand-written crossed-out sentence in both the value-added and
paging service portions of the agreement. 76 The eliminated sen-
tence sought to condition the fifty percent foreign investment
"with operation and management control permitted." 77 Though
it is evident that negotiators did not agree to this explanatory
sentence, China's recent Telecommunication Regulations effec-
tively accomplish its purpose. 78
China's Telecommunications Regulations reveal that China
anticipated containing its requirements to few competitors early
on. The regulations limit investment to high-profit foreign firms
and high-profit Chinese firms. 79 The select group of foreign in-
vestors must have telecom revenues greater than $10 billion
during the two years prior to applying to operate in China. 8 0
Additionally, by giving the Chinese joint venture partner power
over chairperson appointments, China retains control over for-
eign investment.' 8 ' The regulations narrow the pool of foreign
firms qualified to enjoy China's market access commitments and





178. Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China
(Guowuling No. 291) (Sept. 25, 2000); see also ASIA PULSE, China to Honor Free
Trade Commitments in Telecom Sector, 2000 WL 26878649 (Sept. 26, 2000) (stating
that Minister of Information Industry Wu Jichuan announced in a press conference
that qualified private firms will be permitted to invest in China's telecommunica-
tions sector).
179. Matt Forney, Chinese Investors Offer Static on Telecom Rules: Smaller For-
eign Investors May Get Shut Out, ASIAN WALL ST. J. Sept. 26, 2000; see also Laura
B. Sherman, China After the WTO, What You Need to Know Now: The Impact of
China's WTO Entry on the Telecommunications and IT Sectors, PLI Order No. AO-
0095, at 230-31 (Feb. 2001).
180. Vivienne Bath & Cindy Chong, China's New Telecommunications Regula-
tions, (Nov. 2000), at http://www.coudert.com/practice/chinanewtelecom.htm.
181. Forney, supra note 179.
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GATS Article XVI Market Access commitments restrict
members from adopting specified limitations unless they are de-
tailed in the member's Schedule. 182 The intent of the commit-
ment is designed to remove all entry barriers unless candidly
expressed. Seemingly, China has already undermined this
commitment. 8 3 Arguably though, China can restrict the thresh-
old requirements for qualified foreign firms before the market
access commitments apply. There is no MFN violation when all
foreign firms are treated under the same screening process.
However, it is open to interpretation whether the Market Access
commitments must apply to all foreign firms or only to qualified
foreign firms. The generalized commitment to Market Access
lends itself to a broader reading, which arguably could allow a
member to condition market entry with prerequisites before the
Market Access commitments can be applied and enforced.
China's recent regulations also implicate National Treat-
ment concerns.'8 4 Delegating joint venture authority to Chinese
nationals to determine "qualified" foreigners for management
positions affords favorable treatment to "its own like ... service
suppliers."185 Foreigners can be treated differently only if speci-
fied in China's Schedule or if they are not disadvantaged in
their efforts to compete. 8 6 Foreigners are competitively disad-
vantaged when they risk investing in a company in which their
voice in decision making is not based on percent ownership, but
rather a partner's whim. China has replied that restricting the
qualification of foreign partners is an international practice. 8 v
In contrast to these vagaries, China has been laudably ex-
plicit about percentage ownership and timelines for entry.
Though the reasons for selecting percentages lower than forty-
nine percent is unclear, China rejected WTO members' efforts to
exact concessions of foreign member ownership at fifty-one per-
cent as "politically unacceptable."18 8 Carefully selected figures
suggest Chinese domestic law implications in cases where com-
pany control hinges on percent ownership. Domestic law should
clarify the implications of joint venture ownership versus pub-
182. GATS, supra note 49, at Market Access, part III, art. XVI.
183. Sherman, supra note 179, at 230-31.
184. GATS, supra note 49, at National Treatment, part III, art. XVII.
185. See ASIA PULSE, supra note 178.
186. GATS, supra note 49, at National Treatment, part III, art. XVII.
187. See ASIA PULSE, supra note 178.
188. Winestock, supra note 50.
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licly held stock ownership. Percentage limits on foreign owner-
ship largely reflect protectionist efforts, which have been the
context of heated debate in United States politics. Congres-
sional legislation introduced in 2000 threatened to cap foreign
investment in American telecommunications companies at
twenty-five percent, which raised national treatment and mar-
ket access concerns within the WTO.18 9
The United States is bound to honor its Reference Paper
commitments. It has faced the challenge of removing existing
barriers in telecommunications policy but must work to prevent
their future emergence. 190 Efforts to pass a congressional bill
contrary to WTO commitments raise questions about national
sovereignty and the binding nature of international commit-
ments. The uncertainty of international agreements helps ex-
plain China's interest in carefully tailoring its foreign ownership
percentages from the beginning of its commitment. American
law permits the government to block foreign investment over
twenty-five in an American telecommunications company based
on a subjective "public interest" standard. 191 China's restrictive
market access criteria accomplish the same goal.
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
AND THE INDEPENDENT REGULATOR
Upon accession, China must appoint an independent regu-
lator to self-regulate its compliance with WTO commitments.
To assure true independence, the regulator may have no inter-
189. Foreign Government Investment Act of 2000, S. 2793, 106th Cong. (2000);
see Foreign Government Ownership of American Telecommunications Companies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications, Trade & Consumer Protec-
tion, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Ambassador Richard Fisher, Assistant U.S.
Trade Rep.); Foreign Government Ownership of American Telecommunications
Companies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications, Trade & Con-
sumer Protection, Foreign Government Ownership of American Telecommunications
Companies introduced by Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-SC); Testimony by Ambassador
Richard Fisher, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep., to Subcommittee on Telecommunications
Trade & Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of William E. Ken-
nard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission); See also Caron Carlson,
Lawmakers Prepare Move Against Foreign Ownership, WIRELESS WEEK, Sept. 11,
2000, available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/index.asp?layout=
printpage&articlelD=CA13806&doc id=. The European Union and Japan have
threatened to challenge the United States at the WTO if the legislation becomes law.
Id.
190. Barshefsky, supra note 30.
191. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1994).
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ests in the telecommunications industry.192 The MII will likely
evolve into the independent regulator, although at this stage the
benefactor of this role is yet unclear. 193
The problem lies in the historically intimate relationship
and conflict of interest between carrier and regulator.194 State-
run companies have little to fear from the regulator that nursed
them.195 The MII retains one hundred percent of China Telecom
and eighty percent of China Unicom. Both companies are still
operated and regulated by the same entity. 9 6 China has little
choice but to hire those state officials who ran China Telecom
from within the Ministries until just a few years ago. Practi-
cally speaking, the knowledge pool from which to choose carrier
and regulator officials is limited to those who know the indus-
try. Therefore, nepotism between carrier and regulator is ram-
pant, but justifiable.
For instance, in a two-month period at the beginning of
2000, the MII's Telecommunication Administration Bureau
went through two Director-Generals. 97 The first was quickly
promoted to Vice Minister of MII and the second was reassigned
to be Vice President of the newly split China Telecom. 98 The
third and present Director-General was a Bureau Director of the
old China Telecom. 199 Additionally, the former Vice Minister of
MPT heads China Telecom. 200
China seeks to spin off the former ministries that were
merged to form the MII into independent corporations. Enter-
prises associated with those former ministries include China's
major postal, computer, and electronics companies. With state-
run beginnings, China is depending on those former ministries
to evolve into competitive companies that meet the standards
the WTO Reference Paper demands. Ultimately, the people
192. Bing Zhang & Mike W. Peng, Telecom Competition, post-WTO Style, CHINA
Bus. REV., May 1, 2000 at 5.
193. Matt Forney, China Gives Foreign Firms Telecom Access: New Rules May
Open Sector, Maintain Regulatory Ties, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 7, 2000.
194. Leahy, supra note 134.
195. Id.
196. Yeong, supra note 115. China Unicorn complained that MPT was both its
competitor and its regulator, when the MPT still existed and commissioned China
Telecom. See MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at 62.
197. Wang, supra note 126.
198. See id. (including Zhang Chunjiang and Chang Xiaobing).
199. See id. (including Su Jinsheng, the previous director of the Mobile Commu-
nication Bureau of the old China Telecom).
200. See id. (referring to Zhou Deqiang as the president and party chief of the
new China Telecom).
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needed to manage tomorrow's private companies are the gov-
ernment officials of today.
If MII is to be the independent regulator the WTO Refer-
ence Paper requires, it must sever its connection with China
Telecom and China Unicorn, an unlikely occurrence in the short
term.201 As a tactical move, China has structural, political, and
economic incentives to favor state-owned domestic carriers and
delay entry of foreign carriers.202 Creating the independent
regulator is often slow and time-consuming because it involves
sensitive legal and political considerations. Several WTO mem-
ber countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, have signed the
Reference Paper but have yet to create independent regula-
tors. 20
3
With the addition of newcomers to each telecommunications
service sector through government license grants, the market
will require each existing player to develop innovative market-
ing and distribution techniques to compete. To fulfill these
market requirements, companies will seek the competitive ex-
pertise of foreign partners.204 China has pledged that it will not
attempt to influence, directly or indirectly, the commercial deci-
sions of state-owned or state-invested companies, except as con-
sistent with the WTO.20
China will also face pressure from foreign partners. Re-
cently, state-owed China Unicom sold more than a twenty per-
cent share on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges,
raising 5.65 billion dollars.206 The larger the percent sold, the
less control the government retains over its telecommunications
network. A foreign investor with a high percent of ownership
will presumably demand voting rights or a degree of influence in
management. 207  The Chinese government is cautiously
sculpting a domestic telecommunications environment that will
meet WTO commitments and fuel a competitive economy. To
facilitate this process, China must clearly delineate its policy
201. Zhang & Peng, supra note 192, at 5.
202. Id. at 9.
203. See Chong & Chow, supra note 82, at 7.
204. Leahy, supra note 134 (stating that more licenses lead to more competition
which in turn leads to a need for foreign expertise).
205. Agreement on Market Access, supra note 21, Working Party Report Lan-
guage on Commercial Operation of State-Owned and State-Invested Enterprises.
206. Wonacott, supra note 129.
207. Leahy, supra note 134 (quoting an executive of a Vodafone rival as saying,
"They (Vodafone) have an equity interest but not much management control"
regarding Vodafone's recent deal with China Mobile).
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and guidelines in published law.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR "LEAPFROGGING"
A. PROTECTIONIST POLICY TO MONITOR AND YET ENCOURAGE
"LEAPFROGGING"
China's WTO negotiations have been successful, if only for
one reason: the market potential for wireless communication.
China is primed to leapfrog into mobile services, the highest
revenue generator in the telecommunications services market,
with the necessary infusion of foreign capital and investors
whose management and control interests are limited for three
years.208 Mobile services are the "crown jewel" in China.20 9 The
President of AT&T China expects China's telecommunications
market to double in size in the next five years, increasing in
value to 100 billion dollars. He forecasts that forty percent of
the market will be wireless. 210 If his prediction proves true, in-
vestors will be lame ducks during those three years of growth.
China is uniquely positioned to avoid the current techno-
logical shortcomings of existing telecommunications systems
and "leapfrog" into advanced telecommunications. 21 1 Developed
countries are heavily committed to older infrastructure that
constrains advancement into new technologies such as digital
telephony.212 The prohibitive cost of reconstructing infrastruc-
ture requires them to adapt rather than start anew. 21 3 Older
systems have a long life and can be financially difficult to up-
208. Wang, supra note 126 (noting that mobile telecom services are the highest
revenue generator in China's telecom service market). This assumes investors will
have limited power to influence management and operation with a twenty-five per-
cent or thirty-five percent investment within the first three years. See supra notes
28, 32-33 and accompanying text.
209. Leahy, supra note 134.
210. "Twenty percent will be data, four percent will include Internet, and the
remainder fixed line." Leahy, supra note 134.
211. L. KWABENA RIVERSON, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE
OF AFRICA 30-31 (1993); see also MICHAEL HOBDAY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CHALLENGE FROM BRAZIL 71 (1990) (explaining the
possible advantages of technological leapfrogging over industrialized economies that
are heavily committed to investment in previous technologies). Fully digital systems
are less costly and more efficient than electromechanical systems. See id. at 70.
212. HOBDAY, supra note 211, at 71.
213. Id. at 71 (commenting that advanced economies must find piecemeal ways
of patching in new digital services when demand is perceived to be sufficiently high).
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grade.2 14 China will have the benefit of the mistakes and exper-
tise of industrialized countries. 215
Though an attractive theory, leapfrogging has critics who
say the concept is little more than wishful thinking. The diffu-
sion of telecommunications is a gradual process and the new
builds on the old. 216 The basis of this criticism, however, comes
from the 1980s, when today's possibilities of a wireless world
driven by new computer technology were not anticipated. In
China today, leapfrogging to wireless is possible and necessary.
B. CHINA CHOOSES WIRELESS
Wireless technologies are more appropriate for the scat-
tered populations of rural areas. 217 If China is prepared to leap-
frog, its policies will encourage wireless infrastructure out-
growth and divert wireline investment into wireless. Funneling
foreign capital into the next generation of telecommunications is
the most efficient allocation of resources. Other countries, such
as East Germany, have used cellular service to reduce the pres-
sure on the standard network while rebuilding and extending
their existing wireline network. 218  China's efforts at wireless
penetration will provide the initial information system to create
an expansive digital wireline network. Once the wireless net-
work is established, if wireless has equal or better capabilities
than existent wireline, China will have bought enough time to
avoid wireline outgrowth altogether. Thus, China will have al-
lowed technology to prove its investments sound and strategic
predictions correct.
214. RIVERSON, supra note 211, at 30-31 (noting the long life of many telecom
capital investments which are made for thirty to forty years).
215. Analysts estimated that developing countries installing one million tele-
phone lines in the late 1970s paid three to five times less than the developed coun-
tries paid thirty to forty years prior. Id. at 71 (addressing the "economics of late-
ness").
216. Id.
217. Paul S.N. Lee, Telecommunications and Development: An Introduction, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 3, 15 (Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997).
218. Benjamin J. Bates, Learning From the Evolution of Telecommunications in
the Developed World, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 21, 46
(Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997) (noting an effort in East Germany after unification to bring
the East's telecom network up to par with the West's, which employed cellular ser-
vice to reduce pressures on the wireline system while it was built out).
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C. WIRELESS LEAPFROGGING POLICY TO SHRINK THE DIGITAL
DIVIDE
Rather than anticipating a significant digital divide, leap-
frogging supports the theory of technology acting as a cyber-cel
connector. 219 A well-defined policy promoting the build-out of
wireless infrastructure will bring both telephone use and the
Internet to remote areas quicker than wireline. China is an
ideal testbed for wireless Internet access, or Wireless Access
Protocol (WAP), an example of the possibilities of convergence
where the wireless acts as a cyber-cel connector to bring phone
and Internet service into one hand piece.220 In a country of 1.3
billion people, fewer than eleven million Chinese surf the web
and only sixty-five million Chinese subscribe to cellular phone
service. 221 China is, however, one of the fastest growing cellular
phone markets in the world. Analysts anticipate increasing ba-
sic cellular subscribership and six million wireless Internet us-
ers by 2002. These numbers translate into about 386 million
dollars a year in revenue. 222 Once rural areas are connected, the
digital divide will begin to shrink and leapfrogging will enable
the growth of an information economy.
D. EFFECTIVE POLICY TO MINIMIZE THE RURAL RISK IN CHINA
The effects of expanded and cheaper telecommunications on
rural commerce are well documented. In China, more than four
out of five persons reside in the countryside and ninety percent
of households entered the twenty-first century without tele-
219. HOBDAY, supra note 211, at 5 (positing the potential for exploiting the
technological gap).
220. Wang, supra note 126 (noting that China Mobile is vigorously building out
its CMNet network to provide for WAP service). Convergence describes "a trend,
now that most media can be represented digitally, for the traditional distinctions
between industries to blur and for companies from consumer electronics, computer
and telecommunications industries to form alliances, partnerships and other rela-
tionships, as well as to raid each others markets." NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY
223 (16th ed. 2000).
221. China Online, supra note 98 (noting the existence of over sixty-five million
cellular subscribers as of Sept. 20, 2000); Paul Mooney, The Mainland Unplugged:
China's Mobile Masses Put WAP on Trial, ASIAWEEK, May 12, 2000, at 47 (identify-
ing the cellular phone subscribership in China at forty-three million users in 1999).
222. Mooney, supra note 221; see also XINHUA GENERAL NEWS (WIRE SERVICE),
Shanghai Aims at Most Wired City, available at LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA Aug.
29, 2000. "[M]ore than half of the residential communities of Shanghai will be wired
for online shopping, news, distance learning and medical services by the end of
2002." Id.
2002]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
phones. 223 Telecommunications can counteract the rural exodus
to cities and promote balanced economic development through-
out a country. Increased communication availability brings spe-
cialized expertise from cities to rural areas, resulting in more ef-
ficient production. 224  The commercial emphasis on
telecommunications, however, leads to investment policies that
favor urban areas, leaving rural areas underserved. 225 Higher
densities are less expensive to serve and produce higher invest-
ment returns.226 Telecommunications privatization will attract
the capital investment necessary to develop rural
telecommunications, but without government intervention,
investors will only fund profitable, urban areas.227
1. Pro-Rural Policy Benefits the Country
Connecting rural areas can contribute to national unity,
understanding, and political stability.228 Raising the quality of
rural life contributes to the modernization of a nation. Policy-
makers that integrate telecommunications into the national
planning process can curb the growing divide between the in-
formation haves and the information have-nots, but they must
relinquish centralized control of information.229 Assessing a
value to these benefits is incalculable but imperative.230 Ignor-
ing rural communities can result in significant disparity and
cause social and political instability.231 Telecommunications can
223. Alford, supra note 162, at 304; see also MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at
116 (noting the lack of telephone penetration in China).
224. RIVERSON, supra note 211, at 16.
225. Id. at 18.
226. Id.
227. See Lee, supra note 217, at 14. China claimed that liberalization under-
mines the goal of universal service by sacrificing economies of scale in telephone
service. See MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at 121 (noting that remote areas have
inadequate phone capacity and long waiting lists); see also Lee, supra note 90, at 91;
Bates, supra note 218, at 41 (noting that in Great Britain, penetration rates sub-
stantially increased when the country privatized its telecommunications sector).
228. RIVERSON, supra note 211, at 21.
229. Id.; see also MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at 119.
230. RIVERSON, supra note 211, at 31. "Cost-benefit analysis fails to consider
the true benefits of the telecommunications infrastructure because of the lack of un-
derstanding of the economic and social impact of telecommunications." Id.
231. The gap between telecom rich and telecom poor is a situation ripe for politi-
cal instability. See He, supra note 87, at 84; see also John Ure, China's Telecommu-
nications: Options and Opportunities, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
IN CHINA 245, 248 (Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997).
China is a vast country with many minorities from the northern plains of
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both threaten and empower a regime. Government policies are
therefore necessary to encourage telecommunications invest-
ment in rural areas.232
2. Pro-Rural Policy Benefits the Government: Promoting
Countrywide Legal Cohesion
Widely available telecommunications affects governance
and the development of the rule of law in China. 33 Telecommu-
nications can provide a means of effective governance. Though
China's leadership is centered in Beijing and a few powerful
members of the Chinese Communist Party, governance is dele-
gated to provinces and local social units. Implementation of
new federal policy must filter down to local leaders and citi-
zenry. Illustratively, China has projected that the ministerial-
level telecommunications reforms creating the MII will not be
implemented at the local level for one to three years. 23 4
3. Pro-Rural Policy Benefits Foreign Investors
The increased speed of transmitting information permits
well-informed and coordinated decision making.235 However,
China is caught in a Catch-22: Telecommunications infrastruc-
ture is necessary to publicize new federal law, but new federal
law is the source of government permission for the outgrowth of
telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, the underdevelop-
ment of China's information system threatens to impede the
promises of legal stability for foreign investors in telecommuni-
Inner Mongolia to the western high mountains of Tibet, and from the Mos-
lem peoples of Xinjiang province in the Northwest to the Cantonese speak-
ers of Guangdong province in the South, China has many different lan-
guages, including eight major dialects, ethnic groups, cultural traditions,
and local loyalties to meld together. Long distance telecommunications are
essential both for effective military maneuvering, and for national identifi-
cation.
Id.; see also LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA: THE TESTAMENT OF A
CHINA-WATCHER 17 (University of Hawaii Press, 1992). "There is extraordinary co-
hesion among people of individual provinces, and even greater cohesion among peo-
ple from particular districts in a province." Id.
232. The relationship between telephone density and Gross Domestic Product is
well understood. It maximizes the efficient utilization of resources. See RIVERSON,
supra note 211, at 27.
233. Id. at 16.
234. "Premier Zhu Rongi has publicly stated that the structural reforms at all
levels should be completed within three years." MII Memo, supra note 100.
235. RIVERSON, supra note 211, at 27.
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cations services and the commitments of WTO entry.
Telecommunications policy that incorporates leapfrogging
can minimize the risks for investors. Low return on investment
in rural areas is an obvious disincentive for the state, so the
burden to develop rural telecommunications will fall on the ad-
vanced urban core and foreign investors. 236 The WTO Reference
Paper encourages members to institute a policy of Universal
Service to make residential service affordable for all. A Univer-
sal Service policy acts as a cross-subsidy by charging business
telephone users a higher rate and adding a surcharge to urban
users' phone bills, to fund carriers that service high-cost rural
areas. 3 7 The high price of phone installation acts as a cross-
subsidy and means of raising capital for network expansion.
2 38
Any policy resembling Universal Service will assist to push in-
frastructure throughout China's remote areas to provide a con-
nection to the urban core, leading to countrywide legal cohesion
and legal stability for foreign investors.
Considering the advantages of leapfrogging, China should
not look to the United States for answers to telecommunications
policy, but rather for preventive guidance to avoid its mistakes.
The United States telecommunications policy is burdened by its
systematic development of a regulatory regime that today fails
to answer questions of service convergence. Thus, for China, the
United States' approach to telecommunications development
and regulation is not necessarily a prescription for its own de-
velopment. 239 Rather, leapfrogging infrastructure requires leap-
frogging policy. It will soon be the United States' turn to follow
China's lead.
V. CONCLUSION
China will not reverse course at this juncture, or curb its
progress by undermining WTO obligations. China is heavily
committed to telecommunications development both interna-
tionally and domestically. China will honor WTO commitments
236. Lee, supra note 90, at 120.
237. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 (1994) (defining the Universal
Service objective as "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States ... a rapid, efficient Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."); see also
NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 931, 939, 940 (2000).
238. The cost went down to $240 in 1998. MI Memo, supra note 100, at 3.
239. Bates, supra note 218, at 37.
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to the extent its leaders view the WTO as supporting their le-
gitimacy by sustaining economic growth domestically. 240 The
world that is about to witness an explosion of cheap ubiquitous
communications services presents China with the challenge to
open its markets and relax the hand of government. 241 Absent
foreign capital, China will be left behind. China's sweeping
telecommunications reforms in the last two years evidence the
intent to counteract this possibility.
China is strategically positioned to leapfrog obsolete infra-
structure and adopt a wireless backbone. Most notably, China
must also leapfrog its outmoded telecommunications policy.
China is uniquely situated to be a forerunner in the develop-
ment of new policy to address the issues of convergence. Rather
than manipulating old policy, as Western countries must, China
begins with a clean slate and dedication to participating in the
international marketplace.
240. MUELLER & TAN, supra note 54, at 115.
241. Id. at 119.
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